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INTRODUCTION
The United States began signing treaties with Indian Nations in 1778,1 and in
1831 the U.S. Supreme Court described the Indian nations existing within the
territorial boundaries of the United States as Domestic Dependent Nations.2 Until
1978, Indian nations were thought to possess all the inherent sovereign powers
over their territories that had not been taken away by Congress or given up in
treaties.3 However, preoccupied by the assertion of tribal jurisdiction over
individuals who were not tribal members, the Supreme Court in 1978 devised what
became known as the implicit divesture doctrine.4 Under that doctrine, Indian
tribes are said to have lost all inherent sovereign powers inconsistent with their
status as domestic Dependent Nations.5 As a result of this doctrine, since 1978, the
tribes initially lost all inherent criminal jurisdiction over non-tribal members,6 and
as will be explained below, a good deal of civil or regulatory jurisdiction as well.7
The Court’s jurisprudence in this area has been almost universally condemned
by leading scholars as being confusing to the point of incoherence.8 These
*
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1
Treaty with the Delaware Nation, 7 Stat. 13 (1778). In doing so, the United States
followed a tradition started by the Europeans Nations.
2
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
3
See Felix Cohen’s HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (2012 Ed.) at 222223.
4
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978)(Holding Indian tribes
implicitly divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.)
5
Id., at 208.
6
Parts of the Supreme Court decisions in the criminal area were overturned
legislatively. See notes….infra.
7
This paper will use the term “non-members” to describe those individuals who are
not members of the tribe asserting jurisdiction in a given case.
8
See for instance, Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, :
The Judicial Divestiture of Indian Tribal Authority over nonmembers, 109 Yale L.J. 1
(1999), David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the
Supreme Court in Federal Indian Law, 84 Calif. L. Rev. 1573 (1996), Matthew L.M.
Fletcher, The Supreme Court and Indian Policy, 85 Neb. L. Rev. 121 (2006), Michalyn
Steele, Plenary Power, Political Questions, and Sovereignty in Indian Affairs, 63 U.C.L.A.
L. Rev. 666 (2016).
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scholars have argued that when it comes to gauging tribal civil jurisdiction over
non-members, the Implicit Divestiture doctrine is a moribund doctrine of federal
common law unmoored from any congressional policies or constitutional values. It
is a doctrine that has been manipulated by the Court to achieve politically desired
results. Others have been more circumspect in criticizing or condemning the
doctrine.9 Whether justifiable or not, the various formulations of the doctrine has
resulted in confusion and dis-uniformity in the lower courts when it comes to
determine the extent of tribal jurisdiction over non-members.10
While some scholars have offered constructive suggestions and insightful
alternatives to the doctrine,11 in the wake of the recent 4-4 vote in Dollar General
v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw,12 one has to wonder if the Court is at all willing to
reconsider its approach. While I have in the past joined the ranks of those
advocating for the Court to adopt a different approach,13 in this Article I suggest
that the time is ripe to consider legislative solutions to remedy the current state of
uncertainty when it comes to the extent of tribal civil jurisdiction over nonmembers.14 After all, Congress is the entity named in the Constitution to regulate
commerce with Indian tribes.15 As early as 1855, the Court confirmed that
although Indian Nations had retained much of their inherent sovereignty over both
their people and territories, the U.S. Congress possessed “plenary authority” to
9

See for instance, Michael Doran, Redefining Sovereignty for the Era of Fundamental
Rights (forthcoming, Indiana Law Review), Electronic Copy available at:
https://ssrn.com/abstract=3398215. (Arguing that the Court devised the doctrine as a way
to recognize the continued existence of tribal sovereignty while at the same time protecting
the fundamental rights of people who are not members of the tribe.) See discussion infra at
notes…
10
See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Formalism and Judicial Supremacy in Federal Indian
Law, 32 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 391, 409-414 (1007-08).
11
See Matthew Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Sovereignty, 46 Ariz St. L. J.
779 (2014)(Hereinafter Fletcher, Unifying Theory), Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness,
Reimagining Tribal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 101 Cal. L. Rev. 1499 (2013) (hereinafter, Florey
Beyond Uniqueness).
12
136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016). The tie meant that the decision below in favor of tribal
court jurisdiction stood.
13
See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Constitutionalism, Federal Common Law, and the
Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes, 39 Am. Ind. L. Rev. 77 (2014-15).
14
Others have also argued for legislative solutions. See for instance, Ann E. Tweedy,
Connecting the Dots Between the Constitution, the Marshall Trilogy, and United States v.
Lara: Notes Toward a Blueprint for the Next Legislative Restoration of Tribal Sovereignty,
42 U. Mich. J. L. Reform 651 (2009)(hereinafter Tweedy, Connecting the Dots). See also
R. Stephen McNeill, Note, In a Class by Themselves: A Proposal to Incorporate Tribal
Courts into the Federal Court System Without Compromising Their Unique Status as
“Domestic Dependent Nations,” 65 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 283 (2008)(advocating for a
restoration of tribal court civil jurisdiction but recommending the creation of a new Federal
Circuit Court of Appeals to review tribal court decisions for violation of constitutional
rights.)
15
U.S. Constitution, art. I, Section 8, cl. 3.
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govern those domestic nations.16 While I am aware that the tribes would face an
uphill battle in attempting to enact such legislation, it is not an impossible task.
Scholars have already noted that Tribes are surprisingly adept at successfully
pushing legislation through Congress.17 As I and others have suggested, however,
it might be easier for such legislation to be enacted on a tribe by tribe basis.18
This Article, therefore, discusses the various options available to fashion a
legislative correction to the Supreme Court jurisprudence in the area of tribal civil
jurisdiction over non-members. PART I summarizes the Court’s jurisprudence in
the area of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members and outlines the major
problems the Court has noted in recognizing such tribal jurisdiction. PART II
outlines three potential legislative proposals that would confirm tribal civil
jurisdiction over non-members while also attempting to meet the concerns outlined
by the Court. Because the three proposals all involve granting all or at least some
of the protections of the Bill of Rights to non-members subject to tribal
jurisdiction, this Part also discusses the concerns with incorporating Indian tribes
within our constitutional system. Taking such concerns seriously, PART III comes
up with a new legislative proposal which would minimize federal court
interference with the legal and cultural distinctiveness of the tribal judiciaries.
Simply put, the proposal is to reconfirm the civil jurisdiction of any tribal
court over non-member defendants in all causes of action arising on the reservation
as long as the tribal court has met the requirements for establishing personal
jurisdiction over the parties as that term is defined and understood under applicable
U.S. Supreme Court precedents. In addition, tribal courts determinations
concerning the existence of personal jurisdiction would be appealable to federal
courts. Furthermore, in order to facilitate passage of this legislative proposal, I am
recommending allowing non-members the option of removing to federal court
cases filed against them in tribal courts if certain conditions are met.
PART I: TRIBAL CIVIL JURISDICTION OVER NON-MEMBERS
1. The Court’s Jurisprudence

16

United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. 567, 571-74 (1846). See Maggie Blackhawk,
Federal Indian Law as Paradigm within Public Law, 132 Harv. L. Rev. 1789, at 1829-30
(2019). On congressional authority over Indian tribes, see Gregory Ablavsky, Beyond the
Indian Commerce Clause, 124 Yale L.J. 1012 (2015).
17
See for instance, Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Congress and Indians, 86 U. Colo. L.
Rev. 77 (2015). See also Carlson, Legislating Against the Odds, 56 Harv. J. on Legis 23
(2019).
18
See Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra at note 14, at pp 702-709
(2009)(suggesting a piecemeal or subject specific approach.) See also Alexander Tallchief
Skibine, The Supreme Court’s Last 30 years of Federal Indian Law: Looking for
Equilibrium or Supremacy? 8 Colum. J. of Race and Law 277, at 318-320 (2018).
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Because scholars and commentators have already spent considerable amount
to ink analyzing the Court’s jurisprudence in this area,19 I will only go over the
highlights in this analysis. My purpose here is to show that, as in other areas of
federal Indian law, while the implicit divestiture doctrine may have started as a
sensible limiting principle on tribal sovereignty, it ended up being used as a
political tool to privilege the rights and interests of non-Indians and non-tribal
members at the expense of tribal sovereign interests in governing their territories.20
The implicit divestiture doctrine has its roots with the 1978 decision in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 21 where the Supreme Court ruled that Indian
tribes had been implicitly divested of the inherent sovereign power to prosecute
non-Indians. According to the Court, such inherent power had been divested
because its exercise by the tribes was “inconsistent” with the tribes’ status as
Domestic Dependent Nations existing within the borders of the United States.22
The Court further held that it was inconsistent with tribal status for tribes to
exercise any inherent power in conflict with the overriding sovereign interests of
the United States.23 In Oliphant such conflict existed because these non-Indians
could be prosecuted by the tribes without being given all the protections of the
Constitution’s Bill of Rights.24 This was a consequence of Talton v. Mayes,25
where the Court held that Indian tribes did not derive their governmental powers
from the Constitution and therefore were not bound by it.
Although Oliphant only dealt with the tribal power to criminally prosecute
non-Indians, the case was extended a few years later to tribal regulatory power
over non-members. The issue in Montana v. United States 26 was whether the Crow
Indian Tribe could regulate non-members fishing on state owned lands within the
exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian reservation. After noting that the restriction
on tribal criminal jurisdiction recognized in Oliphant also supported the
proposition that “the exercise of tribal power beyond what is necessary to protect
tribal self-government or to control internal relations is inconsistent with the
dependent status of tribes,”27 the Montana court came up with the “general
proposition that the inherent powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the

19

See sources listed at note 8. See also, Tweedy, Connecting the Dots, supra at note
14. for a comprehensive treatment of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members see Sarah
Krakoff, Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A Practical Guide of Judges, 81 U.
Colo. L., Rev. 1187 (2010).
20
See Alex Tallchief Skibine, From Foundational Law to Limiting Principles in
Federal Indian Law, 80 Mont. L. Rev. 67 (2019).
21
435 U.S. 191 (1978).
22
Id., at 208.
23
Id., at 209.
24
Id., at 210.
25
163 U.S. 376 (1896).
26
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
27
450 U.S. at 564.
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activities of nonmembers of the tribe.”28 The Court quickly added, however, that in
certain circumstances
Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of
civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservations, even on nonIndian fee lands. A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or
other means, the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual
relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealing,
contracts, leases, or other arrangements. A tribe may also retain inherent
power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee
lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the
health or welfare of the tribe.29
These two exceptions to Montana’s general proposition or rule would come to
be known as the consensual relations exception and the self-government exception.
Although not explicitly spelled out by the Court, it can be inferred that the two
exceptions reflect what the Montana Court believed were powers “necessary to
protect tribal self-government or to control internal relations.”30 In the wake of
Montana, some tribal advocates expressed the feeling that they could work with
these principles, no doubt envisioning a broad scope for the two exceptions.
Initially, the Court seemed to go along. Thus, in National Farmers Union v. Crow
Tribe,31 the Court insisted that before filing their challenge to tribal jurisdiction in
federal court, non-member plaintiffs had to exhaust their tribal court remedies
because “the existence and extent of a tribal court’s jurisdiction will require a
careful examination of tribal sovereignty, and the extent to which that sovereignty
had been altered, divested, or diminished.”32 Two years later, in another tribal
exhaustion of remedies case, the Court stated “Because the Tribe retains all
inherent attributes of sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal
Government, the proper inference from silence… is that the sovereign power…
remains intact.”33 As further explained below, the honeymoon between the tribes
and the implicit divestiture doctrine did not last long.
Since Montana, when it comes to regulatory jurisdiction, except for an early
victory in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache upholding tribal taxation of a non-Indian
energy corporation leasing lands from the tribe,34 and a mixed result in Brendale v.

28

Id., at 565.
Id.
30
See note 27 supra.
31
471 U.S. 845 (1985).
32
Id., at 855-56.
33
480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987).
34
455 U.S. 130 (1982). At the time, Montana was held to only apply to non-member
fee land within the reservation. Whether the same result would obtain after Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353 (2001), is debatable. See discussion infra at notes …
29

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3458087

6

INCORPORATION WITHOUT ASSIMILATION

Confederated Tribes (zoning),35 the tribal interests lost the only other case,
Atkinson Trading v. Shirley,36 involving taxation of a non-Indian hotel owner
located on non-Indian fee land within the Navajo reservation.37 When it comes to
the adjudicative jurisdiction of the tribal courts, the tribal interests lost all three
cases,38 before deadlocking 4-4 without an opinion in Dollar General.39
For a while, some tribal advocates had hoped that the Montana analysis would
only be applicable to tribal regulatory authority and not to the adjudicatory
jurisdiction of tribal courts. The Court itself gave some reasons for tribal optimism.
For instance, in Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante,40 it stated “Tribal authority over the
activities of non-Indians on reservation lands is an important part of tribal
sovereignty. Civil jurisdiction over such activities presumptively lies in the tribal
courts.”41 However, the Court dispelled that notion in 1997 with Strate v. A-1
Contractors,42 when it held that Montana was applicable to limit both tribal
regulatory and adjudicative jurisdiction and that “A tribe adjudicative Jurisdiction
does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction.”43
The issue in Strate was whether the tribal court had jurisdiction to hear a
lawsuit filed by one nonmember against another nonmember over a run of the mill
traffic accident that took place on a state highway running through the reservation.
The Court held that opening the tribal court to such suits was “not necessary to
tribal self-government and … is not crucial to the political integrity, the economic
security, or the health and welfare of the [Three Affiliated Tribes}”44 The
importance of Strate is not only that it substantially narrowed Montana’s second
exception but also that it laid down the rule that a tribal court has jurisdiction over

35

492 U.S. 408 (1990). The case is a good example about how politically manipulated
the implicit divestiture doctrine can be. In Brendale, four justices held that the Tribes can
never zone the fee lands of non-members, three Justices held that tribes could always do so.
The other two Justices, Stevens and O’Connor, decided to split the baby in two and
allowed the tribe to zone non-member fee land in one part of the reservation (closed part)
but not the other (open part). Although these two Justices made a valiant attempt to justify
their result, they were severely criticized by the other seven Justices.
36
532 U.S. 645 (2001).
37
Although some may categorize South Dakota v. Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) as
involving the implicit divestiture doctrine, this is not the case as the Court ended up
remanding on that issue. It was plain, however, that the author of the Opinion, Justice
Thomas, had no doubt the tribe would lose since he stated “After Montana… tribal
sovereignty over nonmembers cannot survive without express congressional delegation …
and is therefore not inherent.” Id., at 695, n.15 (1903).
38
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438 (1997), Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353
(2001), Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle, 554 U.S. 316 (2008).
39
Dollar General v. Mississippi Band of Choctaw, 136 S. Ct. 2159 (2016).
40
480 U.S. 9 (1987).
41
Id., at 18.
42
520 U.S. 438 (1997).
43
Id., at 453.
44
Id., at 459.
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non-members only in cases where the tribal legislative body could also have
regulated the activities of such non-members.45
In both Strate and a 2001 case, Atkinson Trading v. Shirley,46 involving tribal
taxing authority over non-members, the Court went out of its way to specify that
the lands where the non-member activities took place was owned in fee by nonmembers. However, later in 2001, the Court in Nevada v. Hicks unanimously held
that the Montana principle extended to both non-Indian and Indian owned land.47
The issue in Hicks was whether a tribal member could sue two state game wardens
in tribal court. Hicks had alleged that the wardens had damaged his property and
violated his civil rights when they searched his home which was located on Indian
owned land within the Fallon Paiute-Shoshone Tribes reservation in western
Nevada. The wardens had conducted the search as part of an investigation into
alleged violations by Hicks of state hunting regulations committed outside the
reservation.
Justice Scalia wrote the opinion for the Court and although he concluded that
“tribal authority to regulate state officers, in executing process related to the
violation, off reservation, of state laws is not essential to tribal self-government or
internal relations,”48 his analysis deviated substantially from previous implicit
divestiture cases. Thus, after stating that “state sovereignty does not end at a
reservation’s border,”49 he asserted that evaluating the tribal right of selfgovernment requires “an accommodation between the interests of the Tribes and
the Federal Government, on the one hand, and those of the State, on the other.”50 In
other words, he performed some sort of “balancing of the interests test.”51
Although all Justices agreed to extend Montana to activities conducted on Indianowned land, the Court was badly split on what weight the status of the land should
carry in performing any balancing of the interest test to determine whether the
Tribe had jurisdiction.
Justice Scalia writing for the Court took the position that the status of the land
can be, at times, an important factor.52 It should be noted, however, that only
Justices Rehnquist and Ginsburg agreed with him on that specific point. Justices
Souter, Kennedy and Thomas took the position that the status of the land was
never a “primary jurisdictional fact.”53 Finally, Justices O’Connor, Breyer, and
Stevens thought that the status of the land was always an important consideration.54
45

Id., at 453.
532 U.S. 645 (2001)(Holding that the tribe could not impose a room occupancy tax
on a hotel located inside the Navajo reservation but on non-Indian fee land.).
47
533 U.S. 353 (2001)
48
Id., at 364.
49
Id., at 361.
50
Id., at 362
51
For a more retailed analysis, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Making Sense Out of
Nevada v. Hicks: A Reinterpretation, 13 St. Thomas L. Rev. 347 (2001).
52
Id., at 370-374.
53
Id., at 375-376 (Souter, concurring).
54
Id., at 395-396 (O’Connor, concurring in part).
46
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Hicks created much confusion and disagreements concerning how expansive
or narrow the holding was.55 Some courts have interpreted Hicks narrowly,56 others
have disagreed.57 More recently, the 9th Circuit held that Hicks was not applicable
when there were no state law enforcement interests at stake.58 The 9th Circuit also
has taken the position that Hicks, or Montana for that matter, are not applicable to
cases occurring on Indian owned land where the Tribe has retained a treaty right to
exclude.59
The last Supreme Court’s opinion involving the implicit divestiture doctrine,
Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Ranch,60 shows that the doctrine is so
malleable that it can be easily manipulated to reach just about any kind of result.
At issue was whether the tribal court had jurisdiction to hear a lawsuit brought by
tribal members against a non-Indian bank alleging that the bank had discriminated
against them by offering to sell land within the reservation to non-members on
more favorable terms that it was willing to offer them. Although the land at issue
was now owned by the non-Indian bank, the case clearly involved contractual or
consensual relations as the land had been previously owned by the tribal plaintiffs
who had forfeited the land to the bank but were attempting to repurchase it from
that same bank.61 The Court in a 5-4 opinion per Justice Roberts held that the tribal
court did not have jurisdiction because ”the Tribe lacks civil authority to regulate
the Bank’s sale of its fee land.”62 Thus, Justice Roberts took the position that
Montana only allowed tribes to regulate the “conduct” of non-members in certain
circumstances,63 but that the sale of land was not “conduct” for the purpose of
allowing tribal jurisdiction under Montana.64
According to the tribal plaintiffs, however, the conduct at issue was not so
much the “sale” of non-Indian land as it was the discrimination involved in the
sale of land.65 Pushed to its ultimate limit, this decision would foreclose Indian
55

For a recent summary of the various positions in a case where a cert petition is
currently pending at the Supreme Court see Knighton v. Cedarville Rancheria, 922 F.3d
892, 899-902 (9th Cir. 2019).
56
See McDonald v. Means, 309 F.3d 530 (9th Cir. 2002), Smith v. Salish and
Kootenai College, 434 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir. 2006).
57
MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057 (10th Cir. 2007).
58
Window Rock Unified School District v. Reeves, 861 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cir 2017).
59
See Water Wheel Camp Recreational Are v. La Rance, 642 F.3d 802 (9th Cir.
2011). For an insightful and comprehensive analysis of this issue, see Judith V. Royster,
Revisiting Montana: Indian Treaty Rights and Tribal Authority over Nonmembers on Trust
Lands, 57 Ariz. L. rev. 889 (2015).
60
554 U.S. 316 (2008).
61
The tribal plaintiffs had forfeited the land because they were unable to make the
monthly mortgage payments.
62
554 U.S. at 330.
63
Id., at 332
64
Id., at 334, (stating that “the distinction between sale of the land and conduct on it
is well established… and entirely logical given the …liberty interest of nonmembers.”)
65
This why Justice Ginsburg, concurring in part and dissenting in part, argued that
the Court should have just limited the tribal court remedy (forcing the sale of land to the
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tribes from ever sanctioning non-members for discriminating against tribal
members when selling anything on the reservation.66
2. United States v. Lara and the Constitutionality of Legislation Reaffirming
Tribal Inherent Civil Jurisdiction over Non-members
Before proceeding to describe potential legislative solutions to the Court’s
implicit divestiture doctrine, a word on the constitutionality of such legislation is in
order. In United States v. Lara,67 the Court held that Congress could reaffirm the
inherent power of Indian tribes to prosecute non-member Indians even though the
Supreme Court in Duro v. Reina,68 had held that power to have been implicitly
divested.69 At issue in Lara was the constitutionality of the so called Duro Fix
legislation.70 That legislation had amended the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 to
provide that the tribes’ power of self-government included “the inherent power of
an Indian tribe, hereby recognized and affirmed, to exercise criminal jurisdiction
over all Indians.”71 The question in Lara was whether the United States could
prosecute Billy Jo Lara, an enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Band of
Chippewa, after the Spirit Lake Indian tribe had already prosecuted him for the
same crime. Lara argued that because Congress could not have reaffirmed the
inherent power of the tribe to prosecute him, the first (tribal) prosecution must
have been done pursuant to a “delegation” of federal authority to the tribe. The
second (federal) prosecution for the same crime, therefore, was barred by the
Double Jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution.72
The Court held that Congress could indeed reaffirm the inherent power of
Indian tribes to prosecute non-member Indians such as Lara, even after Duro v.
Reina. In order to arrive at this conclusion, the Court found that decisions such as
Oliphant and Duro were not constitutional decisions. Instead they were decisions
based on Federal common law. The Duro-Fix legislation just “relaxes the

tribal Plaintiffs) while still upholding the tribal court jurisdiction over the discrimination
claim. Id at 342-352.
66
At least if such sales occurred on non-Indian fee land although some would argue
that Hicks may have blurred any distinction between Indian and non-Indian owned land
within a reservation.
67
541 U.S. 193 (2004).
68
495 U.S. 676 (1990).
69
Duro had basically extended the rational of Oliphant which had dealt with tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians to tribal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, meaning
members of other tribes than the prosecuting tribe.
70
For a more comprehensive treatment, see Alex Tallchief Skibine, Duro v. Reina
and the Legislation that Overturned It: A Power Play of Constitutional Dimensions, 66 S.
Cal. L. Rev. 767 (1993).
71
25 U.S. C. 1301(2).
72
The Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution reads in part “nor shall any person
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb.”
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restrictions… that the political branches had imposed on the tribes’ exercise of
inherent prosecutorial power.”73 The Court further found that Oliphant and Duro
reflect the Court's view of the tribes' retained sovereign status as of the
time the Court made them. They did not set forth constitutional limits
that prohibit Congress from changing the relevant legal circumstances,
i.e., from taking actions that modify or adjust the tribes' status. To the
contrary, Oliphant and Duro make clear that the Constitution does not
dictate the metes and bounds of tribal autonomy, nor do they suggest that
the Court should second-guess the political branches' own
determinations.74
As I have argued elsewhere, however, Justice Breyer’s opinion in Lara seems
to be at odd not only with the actual rational of Duro,75 but also with the Montana
line of cases.76 Thus, the Lara Court failed to mention that Montana had given a
somewhat different explanation than Oliphant for divesting tribes of jurisdiction.77
Furthermore, unlike Oliphant and arguably Duro, the Montana Court never relied
on or cited any congressional statutes reflecting a congressional support, explicitly
or implicitly, for the proposition that tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members had
been implicitly divested.78 Could this mean that the Lara analysis concerning the
existence of congressional power to reaffirm the inherent powers of Indian tribes to
criminally prosecute non-members would not be applicable to legislation
reaffirming the existence of tribal inherent civil jurisdiction over non-members?
Not really. For one, Justice Stewart in Montana relied completely on Oliphant
when he wrote “Though Oliphant only determined inherent tribal authority in
criminal matters, the principles on which it relied support the general proposition
that the inherent powers of an Indian tribe does not extend to the activities of
nonmembers of the tribe.”79
It has to be noted that although Billy Jo Lara had argued that his prosecution
was conducted in violation of the Due Process Clause of the U.S. Constitution, the
Court held that because of the procedural posture of the case “We need not, and we
shall not, consider the merits of Lara’s due process claim.”80 While the Court has
never definitely addressed the validity of such due process claims and scholars
have disagreed as to their merits,81 the more credible attacks on such legislation is
73

541 U.S. at 200.
Id., at 205.
75
See Alex Tallchief Skibine, United States v. Lara, Indian Tribes, and the Dialectic
of Incorporation, 40 Tulsa L. Rev. 47, 53-56.
76
Id., at 56-57.
77
See discussion supra at…..
78
Skibine, Dialectic of Incorporation, at 57.
79
Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981).
80
Id., at 209.
81
Compare Gould, “Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty after Atkinson
and Hicks, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 669 (2003)(against the Duro Fix) with Samuel E. Ennis,
74
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the potential lack of available due process during criminal prosecutions.82 Even if
they have some validity, which is by no means certain,83 such due process
arguments would have much less force when considering legislation confirming
tribal civil adjudicative jurisdiction over non-members. In such civil cases,
controversial tribal provisions such as the lack of any obligations to provide
counsels to indigent defendants in tribal criminal cases would not be implicated.
Finally, even though he is no longer on the Court, Justice Kennedy’s concerns
as reflected by his Duro opinion and his Lara concurrence about Congress
subjecting to tribal jurisdiction non-tribal members who have not consented to
such jurisdiction should not be forgotten. In Duro,84 after holding that Indian tribes
had no criminal jurisdiction over non-member Indians, Justice Kennedy concluded
by stating “The retained sovereignty of the tribe is but a recognition of certain
additional authority the tribes maintain over Indians who consent to be tribal
members.”85 Justice Kennedy picked up on his “consent of the governed” theory in
his Lara concurrence,86 where he stated
The Constitution is based on a theory of original, and continuing, consent
of the governed. Their consent depends on the understanding that the
Constitution has established the federal structure, which grants the
citizen the protection of two governments, the Nation and the State…
Here, contrary to this design, the National Government seeks to subject a
citizen to the criminal jurisdiction of a third entity to be tried for conduct
occurring wholly within the territorial borders of the Nation and one of
the States. This is unprecedented. There is a historical exception for
Indian tribes, but only to the limited extent that a member of a tribe
consents to be subjected to the jurisdiction of his own tribe.87
It is unclear whether Justice Kennedy was attempting to make a constitutional
argument. Perhaps it can best be described as a quasi-constitutional one. The noted
Reaffirming Indian Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction over Non-Indians: An Argument for
a Statutory Abrogation of Oliphant, 57 UCLA L. Rev. 553 (2009)(In favor).
82
For an analysis of the arguments involved see Comment, Will Trachman, Tribal
Criminal Jurisdiction after U.S. v. Lara: Answering Constitutional Challenges to the Duro
Fix, 93 Cal. L. Rev. 849 (2005).
83
See for instance Morris v. Tanner, 288 F.Supp.2d 1133, 143 ((2003)(finding no due
process violation because accused could invoke violation of the Indian Civil Rights Act
which made provisions similar to the Bill of Rights applicable to the tribal court), and
Means v. Navajo Nation, 432 F.3d 924. 935 (9th Cir. 2005)(Finding no violation of Due
Process because of the applicability of the Indian Civil Rights Act and the fact that under
Navajo Nation law, the right to appointed counsel was provided to anyone under the
jurisdiction of the Navajo Nation.)
84
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990).
85
Id., at 693.
86
541 U.S. 193, 211-214 (Justice Kennedy concurring) (2004).
87
Id., at 212.
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scholar Philip Frickey once described Kennedy’s argument in Lara as mystical,
stating “Justice Kennedy’s opinion is mystical, in two senses of the word. His
argument from deep constitutional structure and ongoing consent of the governed
is not only obscure, but also seems to depend upon a direct communication with a
sacred constitutional omnipresence to which at least some of the rest of us are not
privy.”88 Whatever one might think of the argument, one thing is clear, Kennedy in
his Lara opinion was attempting to provide strong legal policy arguments for not
extending tribal jurisdiction over non-consenting individuals who are not tribal
members.
3. The Court’s Major Concerns with Tribal Civil Jurisdiction over Non-members
In spite of the Court claiming to decide the existence of tribal civil jurisdiction
on whether such jurisdiction is “necessary” to tribal self-government or whether
there are consensual relations of the qualifying kind, some of the Justices who
routinely ruled against tribal jurisdiction have at times highlighted what was really
troubling them with tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members. Professor Fletcher
has already summarized what non-tribal institutions, such as the Supreme Court,
see as the main objections to tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members.89 Although
I endorse his analysis, here are some additional comments summarizing my views
about these objections. The following six objections to tribal court jurisdiction are
subjectively listed below in order of importance.
First is the fact that the United States Constitution does not apply to Indian
tribes. Early on, the Court ruled in Talton v. Mayes that unlike the federal and state
governments, tribal governments were not bound by the Constitution.90 As stated
by the Court,
the existence of the right in congress to regulate the manner in which the local
powers of the Cherokee Nation shall be exercised does not render such local
powers federal powers arising from and created by the constitution of the
United States. It follows that, as the powers of local self-government enjoyed
by the Cherokee Nation existed prior to the constitution, they are not operated
upon by the fifth amendment, which, as we have said, had for its sole object
to control the powers conferred by the constitution on the national
91
government.
Justice Kennedy was the most concerned among the Justices with that fact. His
decision in Duro v. Reina,92 denying Indian tribes criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians is normatively based on the fact that as citizens of the United
88

See Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Public Policy,
119 Harv. L. Rev. 431, 467 (2005).
89
See Fletcher, Unifying Theory, supra note10, at pp. 822-828.
90
163 U.S. 376 (1896). This is not to say that tribal courts do not believe in
fundamental fairness and due process. See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Indian Courts and
Fundamental Fairness: Indian Courts and the Future Revisited, 84 U. Colo. 59 (2013).
91
163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896).
92
495 U.S. 676, 696-694 (1990).
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States, non-member Indians have not consented to be governed by tribal entities
outside the structure of the Constitution.93 Justice Kennedy restated these concerns
in his concurring opinion in United States v. Lara, when he stated “Lara, after all,
is a citizen of the United States. To hold that Congress can subject him, within our
borders, to a sovereignty outside the basic structure of the Constitution is a serious
step.”94
This argument, however, cannot be overstated. As explained below, the 1968
Indian Civil Rights Act made almost all the provisions of the United States Bill of
Rights applicable to tribal governments and their courts.95 In addition, not being
bound by the United States Constitution is what make tribal courts unique. As
explained below,96 some believe that making the Constitution applicable to tribal
courts would completely assimilate them into the United States constitutional
system and would amount to a “Devils Bargain.”97
Second is the lack of independence in some tribal judiciaries. In other words,
some tribes do not have the same principle of separation of power that we have.
Therefore, some tribal judges do not have lifetime tenure and can be fired by the
tribes’ Executive or Legislative branches. Justice Kennedy once stated that tribal
courts were often “subordinated to the political branches of the tribal
governments.”98 In a later case, Justice Souter agreed with this assessment.99
While this is true of some tribal governments, it seems that the great majority of
tribal courts have in fact a significant amount of independence from the other
branches of the tribal government.100 Besides, not all judges are as independent as
federal judges. State judges, for instance, may be independent from the state
executive and legislative branches, but they are not immune from political
pressures as many of them are elected and some can even accept campaign
contributions.101
Third is the fact that there is no mechanism for federal or state court to review
tribal decisions even if the grounds for the tribal court’s decision are based on
federal or state law. As stated by Justice Souter, this would result in “a risk of

93

See discussion supra at notes…….
541 U.S. 193, 212 (2004)(Kennedy concurring).
95
See discussion infra at notes……
96
Se discussion infra at notes……
97
Id., at notes……
98
495 U.S. 676, at 693.
99
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 385.
100
See Kirke Kickingbird, Striving for the Independence of Native American Tribal
Courts, 36 Hum. Rts. 16 (Winter 2009), Frank Pommersheim, Tribal Courts
Jurisprudence: A Snapshot from the Field, 21 Vt. L. Rev. 7, 15. (1996).
101
For a discussion on how problematic such contributions can be, see Caperton v.
A.T. Massey Coal Co. 129 S. Ct 2252 (2009). For an overview of issues relating to Judicial
bias, see Dmitry Bam, Recusal Failure, 18 NYU J. Leg. & Pub. Pol. 631 (2015), Comment,
Due Process and Judicial Disqualification: The need for Reform, 38 Pe. L. Rev. 1109
(2011).
94

Electronic copy available at: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3458087

14

INCORPORATION WITHOUT ASSIMILATION

substantial disuniformity in the interpretation of state and federal law.”102 While
this observation is correct,103 the proposal I am putting forth in this article will go a
substantial way in alleviating this concern.104
Fourth is the so-called Democratic Deficit: The fact that non-members cannot
participate in the political life of the tribes in that they cannot vote in tribal
elections.105 For instance, Justice Kennedy in Duro v. Reina stated that the Court
should “hesitate to adopt a view of tribal sovereignty that would single out another
group of citizens, non-member Indians, for trial by political bodies that do not
include them.”106 Related to this concern is the accusation that tribal bodies that do
not include non-members would be biased against such political outsiders.107
Professor Fletcher called this objection “racial exceptionalism.”108 However, as he
noted, citizens of one state are routinely subjected to the jurisdiction of courts
located in other states.109 In addition, foreigners can also be sued in the domestic
courts of the United States. It also has to be noted that in earlier decisions, the
Court did not agree with these concerns. For instance in Iowa Mutual v.. Laplante,
the Court stated:
Petitioner also contends that the policies underlying the grant of diversity
jurisdiction—protection against local bias and incompetence—justify the
exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case. We have rejected similar attacks
on tribal court jurisdiction in the past… Moreover, the Indian Civil Rights Act
provides non-Indians with various protections against unfair treatment in the
tribal courts.110
Fifth, many non-tribal judges see tribal law as foreign and different than regular
American law. They claim that tribal law is frequently unwritten, and based on

102

Id., at 385.
Although the Court in National Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845
(1985), allowed non-members to challenge tribal court jurisdiction in Federal courts, in a
subsequent case, Iowa Mutual v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987), it took the position that once
a federal court determined that the tribal court did have jurisdiction “proper deference to
the tribal court system precludes relitigation of issues raised by [the non-member] and
resolved in tribal court.” Id., at p. 19.
104
Se discussion infra at notes…
105
That expression as applied to Indian tribes was first coined and noted by Professor
T. Alexander Aleinikoff in his book, Semblance of Sovereignty: The Constitution, The
States, and American Citizenship 115 (2012).
106
495 U.S. 676, at 693.
107
Many of these accusations and concerns were rebutted by Professor Bethany
Berger in Justice and the Outsider: Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Tribal Legal Systems,
37 Ariz. St. L.J. 1047 (2005).
108
Fletcher, A Unifying Theory, at 826-827.
109
Id., at 824.
110
480 U.S. 9, 18-19 (1987).
103
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orally transmitted customs and traditions.111 For instance, Justice Kennedy once
expressed the view that tribal courts were “influenced by unique customs…
unspoken practices, and norms.”112 Justice Souter described Tribal law as the
results of a “complex mix… which would be unusually difficult for an outsider to
sort out.”113 At least one scholar has noted, however, that most cases involving
non-members would be based on western European legal concepts and would not
involve traditional tribal law.114
Sixth is not an objection as much as a pragmatic consideration based on
political expediency. It is the fact that the Court is under the impression that in
most of the cases where tribal jurisdiction has been denied, the tribal plaintiff could
sue in state or federal court. For instance, in Nevada v. Hicks, Justice Scalia
observed that the Tribe or its members could always “invoke the authority of the
Federal Government and federal courts (or the state government and state courts)
to vindicate constitutional or other federal and state- law rights.”115 Similarly in
Strate v. A-1 Contractors, Justice Ginsburg concluded her opinion denying tribal
court jurisdiction by stating “Gisela Fredericks may pursue her case against A-1
Contractors and Stockert in the state forum open to all who sustain injuries on
North Dakota’s Highway. Opening the Tribal Court for her optional use is not
necessary to tribal self-government.”116
Although this perception has, legally speaking, some validity,117 it is
problematic for many reservation Indians. While I do not doubt that tribal
governments and Indian owned businesses would have no problem filing lawsuits
in federal or state courts, the same cannot be said of the many reservation Indians
who live below the poverty level.118 For such individuals, the same criticisms that
is levelled when courts authorize non-Indians to be sued in culturally unfamiliar
and different tribal courts can be applied to forcing poverty stricken reservation
Indians to file lawsuits in federal or state courts.

111

Professor Fletcher has referred to this objection as “cultural Exceptionalism.” See
A Unifying Theory, at 826.
112
Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676, at 693 (1990).
113
Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, at 384-385 (2001)(Justice Souter, concurring).
114
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Towards a Theory of Intertribal and Intratribal Common
Law, 43 Hous. L. Rev. 701 (2006).
115
533 U.S. 353 at 373 (2001).
116
520 U.S. 438, 459 (1997).
117
For instance, in Three Affiliated Tribes of the Ft. Berthold Reservation v. Wold
Eng’g, 467 U.S. 138 (1984), the Court stated “As a general matter, tribal self-government
is not impeded when a State allows an Indian to enter its courts on equal terms with other
persons to seek relief against a non-Indian concerning a claim arising in Indian Country.”
Id., at 148-49.
118
For a summary of current economic conditions on Indian reservations, see Robert
J. Miller, Sovereign Resilience: Reviving Private-Sector Economic Institutions in Indian
Country, 2018 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 1332, at 1335-1339 (2018).
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PART II: POTENTIAL LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS TENDING TO ALLEVIATE THE
COURT’S CONCERNS

Although there were previous legislative proposals introduced in Congress,
for one reason or another, such proposals never made it into law.119 In all the
solutions described below, the proposed statutes would first confirm or reaffirm
the jurisdiction of tribal courts over many if not all lawsuits arising in Indian
Country.120 However, because the principal concern of the Court seems to be the
lack of constitutional protections afforded litigants in tribal courts, the following
three proposals would afford non-member litigants either all or many of the
protections guaranteed under the United States Constitution Bill of Rights. All
three proposals would also provide some sort of federal court review of alleged
violations of rights guaranteed by the legislation.
1. The VAWA 2013 Model: Guaranteeing Non-members Many If Not All
Constitutional Protections in Tribal Courts
After some 35 years, tribal advocates finally succeeded in enacting legislation
partially overturning the 1978 Court’s decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe that had divested tribes of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.121 Thus,
what is now known as VAWA 2013 reaffirmed tribal jurisdiction over all people,
Indians and non-Indians, accused of certain crimes of domestic violence provided
certain conditions were met and some constitutional rights guaranteed to these
defendants.122
Although previous legislation, known as the Duro Fix,123 overturning a
Supreme Court decision denying tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-member
Indians had simply reaffirmed the existence of such inherent tribal jurisdiction
over such crimes,124 this partial Oliphant Fix ended up being more complicated.125
In order to get Congress’s agreement to the legislation, tribal interests had to agree
to the following:

119

See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Last 30 Years of Federal Indian Law, supra note 17, at
318-320 (describing past legislative proposals.)
120
Indian Country is a term of art derived from 18 USC 1151 according to which the
following are treated as Indian lands for the purpose of jurisdictional analysis: 1. All lands
within Indian reservations, 2. All trust lands held by the U.S. for the benefit of Indians or
tribes, 3. Lands set aside by the federal government for Dependent Indian Communities..
121
435 U.S. 191 (1978).
122
25 U.S.C. 1304 et. Seq. The Tribal provisions were part of the Violence Against
Woman Act Re-authorization of 2013.
123
Codified at 25 U.S. C. 1301(2).
124
See discussion supra at notes…
125
For an insightful and comprehensive examination of VAWA 2013, see Angela R.
Riley, Crime and Governance in Indian Country, 63 UCLA L. Rev. 1565 (2016).
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a. The pool of jurors in such criminal trials has to come from a cross section of the
local population with no group, such as non-tribal members, automatically
excluded.126
b. Tribal governments have to provide an indigent defendant a defense attorney.127
c. Defendants have to be given any other rights necessary for the Bill to be
constitutional.128
d. Defendants have to be provided all other rights available under the Indian Civil
Right Act of 1968 as amended,129 which include among others the right to
effective assistance of counsel if sentences can exceed one year in jail
e. Defendants have the right to appeal their convictions to federal courts pursuant
to the writ of Habeas Corpus.130
A Bill extending constitutional provisions to non-member civil litigants in
tribal courts would be much less burdensome on tribal governments in that
constitutional requirements governing civil litigation are less extensive than those
applicable to criminal prosecutions. Nevertheless, although advocated by some
scholars,131 making the Constitution applicable to Indian tribes is politically
sensitive and problematic.132 The next model would not make constitutional rights
per se applicable to Indian tribes.
2. The Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA) Model: Providing Non-members Federal
Court Review of Alleged ICRA Violations in Civil Cases.
In 1968, Congress enacted the Indian Civil Rights Act affording the statutory
equivalent of almost all the protections of the Bill of Rights to people subjected to
tribal governmental power.133 However, in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez,134 the
Supreme Court held that people complaining of civil rights violation could not
appeal to federal courts unless they were petitioning the court for habeas corpus. In
other words, federal courts did not have jurisdiction over any cases alleging ICRA
violations unless the plaintiffs were also incarcerated or their liberty was at least
meaningfully restricted.
126

25 U.S.C. 1304(d)(3).
25 U.S.C. (f)(2). Federal grants covering such costs were made available to tribes
in the legislation.
128
1304(d)(4). Whether any more or all constitutional rights will have to be given has
not been answered by the courts yet. See Comment, Special Domestic Violence Criminal
Jurisdiction for Indian Tribes: Inherent Sovereignty v. Defendant’s Complete
Constitutional Rights, 164 U. Pa. L. Rev. 243 (2015).
129
1304 (d)(2) (Making applicable all rights of defendants under 25 U.S.C. 1302 (c))
130
25 U.S.C. 1304 (e)(1).
131
See for instance, L. Scott Gould, Tough Love for Tribes: Rethinking Sovereignty
after Atkinson and Hicks, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 669 (2003).
132
See discussion at PART III (2).
133
Pub. Law 90-284, 82 Stat. 73, 25 U.S.C. 1301 et. seq.
134
436 U.S. 49 (1978).
127
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One solution, previously recommended by some,135 and perhaps less drastic
than the previous one, would allow non-members alleging violation of the Indian
Civil Rights Act the right to appeal tribal court judgments to federal courts. This
proposal is less drastic than the previous one because the ICRA guarantees certain
statutory rights that, although similar to some constitutional rights, have not been
interpreted as equivalent to constitutional rights.136
In Santa Clara Pueblo, the Court first held that the Pueblo could not be sued
in federal court because the ICRA lacked clear and unequivocal congressional
intent to abrogate tribal sovereign immunity.137 Secondly, the Court held that while
the official immunity of the tribal officials could implicitly be abrogated, ICRA did
not contain such an implied cause of action to that effect. The proposed legislation
being discussed here would just create such a cause of action against tribal judges
or other tribal officials as long as the non-member complainant alleged that the
tribal court proceedings or its implementation resulted or would result in violations
of the Indian Civil Rights Act. While this would amount to a modification of Santa
Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, it would not totally overrule the case. The proposal
would not allow individuals to sue tribes in federal courts for any claimed violation
of ICRA. The proposal would only allow non-member defendants to appeal tribal
court judgments to federal courts if they are alleging violation of the Indian civil
rights Act emanating from tribal court proceedings or orders.
3. Creating a Presumption of Tribal Jurisdiction Rebuttable When Tribal Courts
Have Not Applied Fundamental Notions of Fairness or Due Process
In an insightful article, Professor Matthew Fletcher argued that the Court
should adopt a presumption of tribal jurisdiction over Indian owned lands within
Indian reservations.138 However, non-members litigants would be able to file
lawsuits in federal or state courts in order to rebut the presumption of tribal
jurisdiction. The presumption would be rebutted if the non-members were denied a
fundamentally fair decision-making process.139 His proposal only applies over
conduct of non-members on Indian owned land. As to conduct within Indian
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See for instance, Charles Wilkinson, American Indians, Time, and the Law, at
113-119 (1986). See also Amy Conners, The Scalpel and the Ax: Federal Review of Tribal
Decisions in the Interest of Tribal Sovereignty, 44 Colum Hum. Rts. L. Rev. 199, 246-52
(2012).
136
See Developments in the Law: ICRA Reconsidered: New Interpretation of
Familiar Rights, 129 Harv. L. Rev. 1709 (2016), Mark D. Rosen, Multiple Authoritative
Interpreters of Quasi-Constitutional Federal Law: Of Tribal Courts and the Indian Civil
Rights Act, 69 Fordham L. Rev. 479 (2000).
137
436 U.S. 49, at 58-59.
138
Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Unifying Theory of Tribal Sovereignty, 46 Ariz. St. L. J.
779 (2014).
139
Id., at 786.
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reservations occurring on land owned in fee by non-members, the Montana
analysis would still be applicable.140
At first, it seemed that Professor Fletcher’s proposal was limited to federal
court review for lack of adequate tribal “process” which I understood to mean
procedural due process.141 However, later parts of his article seem to also advocate
for more general federal court review of whether tribal litigants were given enough
“American constitutional rights.”142 On the other hand, Professor Fletcher
indicated that whether a tribe had provided enough constitutional rights was a
determination that could be made along the same lines as what courts do when
“deciding whether to grant comity to foreign judgments.”143
Professor Fletcher made his proposal while arguing for a shift in the Court’s
jurisprudence. His argument was not made in connection with proposing
legislation. However, when it comes to legislation, a problem with Fletcher’s
“fundamental fairness” standard is that it would be very complicated to codify.
Thus, the statute would have to specify exactly what constituted a denial of
“fundamental fairness.” Although Professor Fletcher makes a worthy effort to
specify what he is envisioning when it comes to fundamental fairness,144 the task
of actually codifying such concept in legislation could end up being much more
complicated and politically difficult than envisioned. Yet without such
specifications, the courts would be left to themselves to define such concept and
we may end up with just about most of the Bill of Rights applicable to tribal
courts. This would make the Fletcher proposal not much different than the two
previous ones.
I think one possible reason Fletcher did not confine himself to procedural due
process is that his proposal reaches both tribal adjudicative and regulatory
jurisdiction and procedural due process rights either do not apply or apply only
minimally in the enactment of legislation or regulations.145 Because this Essay is
only concerned with the civil jurisdiction of tribal courts, Fletcher’s proposal
should be construed to allow federal court review to rebut the presumption of tribal
court civil jurisdiction only in cases where tribal courts have not given nonmembers all the rights required under general notions of procedural due process.146

140

Id., at 830.
See Fletcher, A Unified Theory, discussion at pp. 831-838, mentioning the need for
fair, unbiased, and competent tribal judges as well as an independent tribal judiciary.
142
Id., discussion at pp. 835-838.
143
Id., at 838.
144
46 Ariz. L. J. at 830-840.
145
This is the classic dichotomy between Londoner v. Denver(adjudication), 210 U.S.
373 (1908), and Bi-Metallic v. Colorado (Rulemaking), 239 U.S. 441 (1915), familiar to all
students of Administrative law holding that procedural due process applies to adjudicative
proceedings but not to rulemaking.
146
For another proposal advocating expanded federal court review see Miller, The
Shrinking Sovereign: Tribal Adjudicatory Jurisdiction over Nonmembers in Civil Cases,
114 Colum. L. Rev. 1825 (2014).
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In other words, the proposal should not cover all potential denial of constitutional
rights to non-members.
Even then, the legislation could be hard to draft with specificity as the
panoply of procedural rights is quite large.147 Federal courts, however, have
developed a comprehensive jurisprudence to determine when and how much
process should be given in any given case.148 The legislation should therefore give
federal courts deference in reviewing tribal proceedings to decide if they have
conformed with the requirements of procedural due process. The next section of
this Essay addresses a different issue with the three proposals analyzed above: The
problem with “constitutionally” incorporating Indian tribes into the federalist
system.
4. A Critique of These Three Proposals: Indian Tribes Should not be Incorporated
Within Our Constitutional Federalism.
In an upcoming article, Professor Michael Doran argued that the Court’s
implicit divestiture doctrine was a solution the Court devised to protect the
constitutional or fundamental rights of non-tribal members without completely
destroying tribal sovereignty.149 To counter the negative impacts of the implicit
divestiture doctrine on tribal sovereignty, Professor Doran summarized various
possibilities that would restore tribal jurisdiction but would also protect
fundamental rights. However, he ended up finding such proposals either politically
unacceptable or otherwise detrimental to Indian tribes.150 One of the possible
solution he mentioned was allowing Indian tribes to assume full civil jurisdiction
over their territories but “forcing tribal governments into the federalist
structure.”151 This would “require tribal governments to respect fundamental rights
of non-tribal members as those rights have been interpreted by the Supreme
Court.”152 Describing such solution as a “Devil’s Bargain,”153 Professor Doran
noted that this remedy may be more harmful to tribes than the implicit divestiture
doctrine itself. Underscoring this finding is that Indian tribes are better off
remaining “outside” the U.S. constitutional system. In other words, incorporating
the tribes within our constitutional system would destroy them as distinct
sovereigns and would end up being worse for the tribes even if this meant that
under the continued use of the Implicit Divestiture doctrine, tribes would
eventually end up losing all civil jurisdiction over non-tribal members.
147

See Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970)(listing a number of available
procedural rights.)
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See Matthews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
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(forthcoming,
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I have in the past warned against such assimilative influences.154 More
recently, however, although conceding that making some aspects of due process
applicable to Indian tribes would be problematic,155 I argued that it may be worth
it, especially if that choice was at tribal option.156 In her analysis about the
implementation of VAWA 2013, Professor Angela Riley also acknowledged the
problems with making constitutional provisions applicable to Indian tribes.157
However, she concluded that some constitutional provisions could be applied to
Indian tribes without jeopardizing their cultural and political distinctiveness. First,
she noted that a lot of existing tribal court procedures are already similar if not
identical to the ones applied in federal and state courts.158 Secondly, she argued
that tribes could emphasize their distinctiveness by moving away from the carceral
state approach prevalent in federal and state sentencing systems and adopt
sentencing provisions more closely affiliated with tribal traditions and culture.159
In debating whether tribes already have or should be “incorporated” into the
United States, one should keep in mind that there is a difference between
“political” incorporation and “constitutional” incorporation, especially if that term
is understood to mean that all constitutional provisions would be applicable to
tribal governments. I have elsewhere argued that Tribes could be “incorporated”
into the United States federalist system without being totally assimilated into the
federal structure.160 In other words, tribes could be incorporated into the federal
system under a third sphere of sovereignty that would allow them to keep their
distinctiveness.161 Indian tribes have already been, at least partially, politically
incorporated into the United States. True enough, there is not one defining
congressional Act incorporating tribes into the United States.162 However, tribes
were geographically incorporated within the territory of the United States under
the doctrine of Discovery as interpreted in Johnson v. M’Intosh.163 Furthermore,
they were politically incorporated incrementally within the United States system as
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See Alex Tallchief Skibine, Troublesome Aspects of Western Influence on Tribal
Justice System and Laws, 1 Tribal Law Journal 2007
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See Skibine, Inherent Powers of Indian Tribes, supra note 12, at 132-133, citing
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1565, 1595-1603 (2016).
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Id., at 1614. See also Barbara L. Creel, The Right to Counsel for Indians Accused
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(2013).
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a result of cumulative legislation enacted by Congress throughout history:164
Legislation such as the Indian Citizenship Act of 1924,165 the Indian
Reorganization Act of 1934,166 the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968,167 and the
Indian Self Determination Act of 1975.168
It is true, however, that the tribes have never been constitutionally
incorporated into the United States. 169 As Professor Frank Pommersheim has
urged, the confusion surrounding the constitutional status and incorporation of
Indian tribes within our federalist system should be resolved through a
constitutional amendment.170 In the last Part of this Article, I attempt to counter the
effect of the implicit divestiture doctrine without assimilating the tribes
constitutionally into the federal structure.
PART III: INCORPORATION WITHOUT ASSIMILATION: MINIMIZING FEDERAL
COURTS INTERFERENCE WITH TRIBAL LEGAL NORMS
1. Making Personal Jurisdiction Doctrines Applicable to Tribal Courts
In this part, following on an idea expressed by Professor Katherine Florey, I
propose to legislatively reconfirm tribal court jurisdiction over all causes of actions
arising in Indian Country as long as the tribal court can establish personal
jurisdiction over the parties.171
In her Article, Professor Florey convincingly demonstrated that the Supreme
Court’s statement first enunciated in Strate v. A-1 Contractors,172 that “A tribe
adjudicative Jurisdiction does not exceed its legislative jurisdiction,”173 has no
theoretical validity.174 Other commentators have also noted that the Court never
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See generally, Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes
within “Our Federalism”: Beyond the Dependency Paradigm, 38 Conn. L. Rev. 667, at
669-677 (2006).
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8 U.S.C. 1401(b).
166
25 U.S.C. 461 et seq.
167
25 U.S.C. 1301 et. seq.
168
25 U.S.C. 450a-450n..
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See David E. Wilkins, A Constitutional Confession: The Permanent Malleable
Status of Indigenous Nations, 37 New Eng. L. Rev. 473 (2003).
170
Frank Pommersheim, Is there a (Little or not so Little) Constitutional Crisis
Developing in Indian Law?: A Brief Essay, 5 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 271, 285 (2003).
171
See Katherine Florey, Beyond Uniqueness: Reimagining Tribal Courts’
jurisdiction, 101 Cal L. Rev. 1499 (2013). Other scholars have expressed similar views.
See for instance Sarah Krakoff, The Renaissance of Tribal Sovereignty: The Negative
Doctrinal Feedback Loop and the Rise of the New Exceptionalism, 119 Harv. L. Rev. F.
47, 52-53 (2005)
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520 U.S. 438 (1997)
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Id., at 453. See also Nevada v. Hicks. 533 U.S. 353, at 367 (2001)(endorsing the
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Florey, Beyond Uniqueness, at 1532-1536.
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gave any reasons whatsoever for this statement.175 Florey’s argument is that tribal
courts should be considered courts of general jurisdiction and be treated like state
courts when it comes to determining the extent of their jurisdiction.
Professor Florey further explained that the Court’s concerns with lack of due
process in tribal court proceedings would be taken care of by having the doctrines
of personal jurisdiction applicable to tribal courts in the same fashion as they are
applied in state and federal courts.176 According to Florey, the Court in
International Shoe v. Washington,177 devised a test allowing a court’s jurisdiction
as long as the defendant maintained minimum contacts with the jurisdictional
forum and such judicial jurisdiction did not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial Justice.178 Furthermore, Professor Florey noted that in Asahi Metal
Industry v. Superior Court,179 the Court took the position that “even if minimum
contacts were present, a lack of reasonableness could defeat personal
jurisdiction.”180 As Florey explained, “reasonable concerns about fairness, bias and
unfair surprise exist when non-members … are haled into tribal courts as
defendants,” however, these “are the traditional concerns of personal
jurisdiction.”181
Tribal courts have in the past already used principles of personal jurisdiction
derived from U.S. Supreme Court precedents to determine their own
jurisdiction.182 It is important to note, however, that principles of constitutional
due process applied to delineate the extent of personal jurisdiction by the United
States Supreme Court are currently not applicable to tribes as such since tribes,
unlike the states and the federal government, are not bound by the United States
Constitution.183 As one commentator has argued, however, due process
requirements are already applicable to tribes through the Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA).184 That same commentator also argued, however, that federal courts have
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not and should not find an implied cause of action in the ICRA for challenging
tribal courts determinations of personal jurisdiction to federal courts.185
Under my proposal, which would impose constitutionally based requirements
of personal jurisdiction on tribal courts, findings of personal jurisdiction by tribal
courts would be appealable to federal courts after exhaustion of tribal court
remedies. Such exhaustion requirements are currently mandated under National
Farmers Union v. Crow Tribe.186 Although the general rule mandating exhaustion
of tribal court remedies was imposed before plaintiffs could challenge the subject
matter jurisdiction of tribal courts, they should remain applicable to a challenge of
personal jurisdiction determinations made by tribal courts as the normative reasons
for the general rule would still be applicable.187 Initially, the Court did note three
exceptions to the tribal exhaustion doctrine.188 These three exceptions would
continue to be applicable to cases challenging the personal jurisdiction
determinations made by tribal courts under my proposal. In Strate v. A-1Contractors, however, the Court added a fourth exception, stating “When, as in
this case, it is plain that no federal grant provides for tribal governance of
nonmembers' conduct on land covered by Montana 's main rule, it will be equally
evident that tribal courts lack adjudicatory authority over disputes arising from
such conduct.”189 That exception would no longer be applicable under my
proposed legislation since the legislation would reaffirm the subject matter
jurisdiction of tribal courts as long as the constitutional due process requirements
for personal jurisdiction were met.
185

Id., at 1277-1281. The commentator noted under current Supreme Court
jurisprudence, it is even harder to find a implied statutory cause of action than it was in
1978 when the Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, refused to find an
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Rights Act. Id., at 60-66.
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served by allowing a full record to be developed in the Tribal Court before either the merits
or any question concerning appropriate relief is addressed... Exhaustion of tribal court
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for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide other courts with the benefit of their
expertise in such matters in the event of further judicial review, 471 U.S. 845, 856–57
(1985).
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The National Farmers Court stated “We do not suggest that exhaustion would be
required where an assertion of tribal jurisdiction “is motivated by a desire to harass or is
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At this point, some may argue that there is not that much difference between
my proposal and Professor Fletcher’s. Set forth below is an enumeration of the
differences:
First, probably to make his proposal more palatable to anti-tribal interests,
Professor Fletcher restricted his proposal to Indian owned fee land within the
reservation and stated that tribal jurisdiction over non-member owned land should
continue to be determined under the Montana doctrine. Under my proposal, the
legislative restoration of tribal jurisdiction over non-members would include all
lands within tribal territories. Secondly, I am confining my legislative restoration
to the adjudicative jurisdiction of tribal courts. Unlike Fletcher, I do not address
the legislative/regulatory jurisdiction of tribal governments. Under my proposal,
tribal regulatory jurisdiction over non-members would continue to be determined
under Federal common law. Third, federal court review of tribal court jurisdiction
under my understanding of Professor’s Fletcher proposal is confined to looking for
lack of procedural due process. Under my proposal, federal courts would just
review whether tribal courts correctly determined that they had personal
jurisdiction over the parties.
I understand that, politically speaking, transposing the Florey personal
jurisdiction approach to a legislative proposal may be seen as too pro tribal for
those in Congress who are objecting to tribal jurisdiction. The rest of this Essay
will explore this issue.
2. General Difficulties with Enacting Pro-tribal Legislation
Past legislative settlements in the field of Federal Indian Law have required
many compromises with non-tribal interests. So far, the pro tribal interests
managed only a partial overturning of Oliphant 35 years after the Court issued that
decision.190 On top of that, the tribes still had to guarantee the required
constitutional protections before being allowed to reacquire such jurisdiction.191 In
other areas of federal Indian law, while Congress was able to initially enact a
relatively balanced compromise on Indian gaming with the passage of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) of 1988,192 tribal interests have not yet been
successful in overcoming the negative impacts of the Court’s decision in Seminole
Tribe v. Florida,193 where the Court held that Congress could not use its Indian
Commerce power to abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment sovereign
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Immunity so as to allow tribes to sue states that failed to negotiate in good faith the
required tribal state gaming compacts.194
Similarly, the tribes have yet to successfully push a legislative fix to the
controversial Carcieri decision,195 which held that only tribes under federal
jurisdiction as of 1934 could benefit from a section in the law allowing the
Secretary of the Interior to transfer land into trust for the benefit of Indian tribes.196
The same goes for Alaska v. Village of Venetie,197 another questionable opinion
where the Court declared that the 40 million acres set aside for Alaskan Indians in
the Alaskan Native Claims Settlement Act (ANCSA) were not Indian Country.198
This meant that federally recognized Indian tribes in Alaska could no longer
exercise regulatory jurisdiction over the lands they owned in fee pursuant to
ANCSA.
The lack of success in the areas just mentioned does not mean that Indian
tribes are never successful.199 There has been dozens of tribal land settlement Acts
enacted into law,200 and an even larger amount of Indian Water Rights
Settlements.201 In addition, there are dozens of tribal specific bills enacted in every
Congress, one of them even overturned an anti-tribal Supreme Court decision.202
However, the tribes will need to put forward some compelling reasons as to why
legislation restoring tribal courts’ civil jurisdiction over non-members is important
and necessary. Professors Fletcher and Tweedy have each enumerated some valid
reasons supporting at least some restoration of tribal civil jurisdiction.203 Thus,
Fletcher cited 1. Congressional and Executive public policy, 2. Protecting the
dignity of tribes as sovereigns, 3. Improving tribal governance capacity, 4.
Evolving tribal economic and political circumstances, and 5. Lack of federal and
state court jurisdiction over tribal lands.204 Tweedy added 1. Erosion of tribal
194
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culture and institutions, 2. Disempowerment of tribal courts, 3. Lack of respect for
tribes, 4. Lack of funding for tribal justice systems, 5. Waste of resources, 6.
Inability to protect tribal interests, and 7. Lawlessness.205
Yet, I understand that allowing tribal jurisdiction over non-members as long
as personal jurisdiction can be established could face an uphill battle even if tribal
courts’ findings of personal jurisdiction can be appealed to federal courts. For one
thing, it will be increasingly hard for tribes to push legislation restoring some kind
of tribal civil jurisdiction over non-members if lobbying groups opposed to tribal
jurisdiction start believing that the Court will eventually prohibit all tribal civil
jurisdiction over non-members. To counter this problem, in the next section, I
propose a political compromise that some tribes may wish to consider in order to
convince groups generally opposed to tribal jurisdiction not to lobby against the
proposal.
3. Facilitating Passage of the Legislation by Allowing for Removal of Tribal
Court Cases to Federal Courts
One possible idea to improve the chances of passing the proposed legislative
solution would be to allow non-member defendants being sued in tribal courts to
remove their cases to federal courts under certain circumstances. This proposal
would follow the model set forth in 28 U.S.C.1441 for removal of civil actions
from state to federal courts.206 In other words, removal could be granted only in
cases the federal court would otherwise have jurisdiction. In other words, in cases
involving federal questions or meeting the diversity requirements.
I am aware that this removal option may not be popular with some tribal
advocates. Yet, I believe this proposal may be less drastic or detrimental to tribal
sovereign interests than anticipated: First, the burden to persuade federal courts to
accept removal would be on the non-tribal parties seeking removal. These removal
requirements can be hard to navigate.207 Secondly, even if a case is removed, the
law of the initial forum, tribal law, should still be applicable to the proceedings.208
Finally, in order to limit federal interference with the distinct nature of tribal
judiciaries,209 I would not grant an unlimited right to remove tribal cases to federal
205

Tweedy, id., at pp. 683-689.
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courts. Instead, federal courts should abstain from granting removal in cases where
important tribal governmental interests are involved unless the federal court finds
that the litigation below was 1. motivated by a desire to harass, or 2. conducted in
bad faith, or 3. tribal jurisdiction was plainly lacking, or 4. the non-member
defendant lacked a fair opportunity to present his case in that the tribal forum was
biased or the non-member party was barred on procedural grounds from raising his
claims.
This modification/addition to the removal requirements contained 28 USC
1441 somewhat tracks the exceptions to the exhaustion of tribal remedies
doctrine,210 but recast them in a different context. It is also inspired by the Younger
Doctrine,211 as well as the other federal abstention doctrines.212 The three
requirements for Younger to apply are: 1. Parallel state proceedings, 2. Implication
of important state interests, and 3. Lack of adequate forums for the party resisting
abstention to raise her (federal) claims.213 On the other hand, the three exceptions
to application of Younger abstention are: 1. Bad faith and harassment, or 2. A
patently unconstitutional state statute, or 3. An inadequate state forum in that it is
biased or the party is barred on procedural grounds from raising its federal
claims.214
An option worth considering from a tribal perspective would be to limit
removal to federal question cases and not include diversity. Similarly, those
opposed to tribal jurisdiction would probably push to go beyond diversity of state
citizenship and allow all non-members to remove cases to federal courts. The
normative argument against both these positions, one pro tribal the other one not,
is that in order to be correctly integrated into the federal system, tribal courts
should be treated, as much as possible, on par with state courts when it comes to
their relations with the federal courts. Thus, for uniformity sake, the whole federal
Courts: Custom and Innovative Law, 24 N.M. L. Rev. 225 (1994), Katherine Florey,
Making it work: Tribal Innovation, State Reaction, and the Future of Tribes as Regulatory
Laboratories, 92 Washington L. Rev. 713 (2017).
210
See discussion supra at note …
211
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
212
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Federal Court Removal Jurisdiction Statute, 31 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 103 (2003).
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removal statute should, to the extent possible, treat tribal and state courts in the
same fashion.
CONCLUSION
For about forty years now, the Supreme Court has been engaged in a
measured attack on tribal sovereignty when it comes to tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers. Although the Court has devised a test seeming to determine the amount
of tribal jurisdiction on whether the exercise of that governmental power is
“necessary” to tribal self-government, in reality, the Court wants to protect or
shield non-members from tribunals that are not bound by the Constitution’s Bill of
Rights.215 Also of concern to the Court is the fact that tribal court orders in the area
of civil jurisdiction are not appealable to federal courts except when one is
challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the tribal court.216 To remedy this
situation, this Essay has proposed a legislative solution which would reaffirm the
civil jurisdiction of tribal courts over non-member defendants as long as personal
jurisdiction over such parties could be established. However, tribal court
determinations of personal jurisdiction could be appealed to federal forums.
Furthermore, in order to facilitate enactment of such legislation, this Essay has
suggested that tribes should consider adding legislative language allowing nonmembers being sued in tribal forums to remove their cases to federal courts if
certain conditions are met.
I believe this solution goes a long way in incorporating or reconfirming
Indian nations as the Third Sovereign within the United States’ legal system.217 At
the same time, it achieves this goal without “assimilating” Indian Nations within
our constitutional system in that it does not make the tribal courts subject to all
constitutional restrictions except for the requirements of establishing personal
jurisdiction.
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